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Recent Developments 
Imbesi v. Carpenter Realty Corp. 
Maryland's Non-Claim Statute Does Not Permit a Creditor Setoff once All 
Creditor Claims Are Barred by Statute 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that section 
8-103 of the Wills and Trusts Article 
of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 
which limits the time a creditor has to 
present a claim, does not permit a 
setoff based upon a creditor's claim 
against the Estate once presentment 
of creditor's claims are barred by 
statutory limitations. Imbesi v. 
Carpenter Realty Corp., 357 Md. 
375, 744 A.2d 549 (2000). The 
court found that permitting a creditor 
to setoff a claim, which was not 
presented in the allotted six month 
time period pursuant to section 8-
103 (c), from monies owed to the 
Estate, would directly conflict with the 
purpose of the statute. The court 
refused to view the defensive use of 
setoff as an exception from the 
Maryland nonclaim statute of section 
8-103, thereby prohibiting any 
assertion of creditor's claim on an 
estate after the applicable six-month 
period expired. 
On June 1, 1982, Mr. Imbesi 
entered into a stock redemption 
agreement between 7-UP of 
Baltimore, 7-UP of Philadelphia, and 
the Carpenter Realty Corporation 
("CRC"), whereby he would sell all 
the stock he owned in the companies 
to the issuing corporations for 
$500,000 payable in 120 monthly 
installments. In 1979, Mr. Imbesi 
issued an $80,000 promissory note 
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to 7-UP of Philadelphia, due October 
23,1989. The promissory note was 
never repaid. Upon the death of Mr. 
Imbesi in 1992, the personal 
representative of the Estate, filed 
Letters of Administration with the 
Baltimore County Register of Wills. 
In addition to these Letters, notice, 
pursuant to section 8-103(a)(1), was 
sent to creditors informing them of 
Mr. Imbesi's death. 
Following the notice to creditors, 
the Estate sued CRC and 7-UP of 
Baltimore in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County for the respective 
overdue balances of the stock 
redemption agreement owed to Mr. 
Imbesi. CRC counterclaimed, 
contending that the claims on the stock 
redemption agreement may be offset 
by the amount on the $80,000.00 note 
originally possessed by 7-UP of 
Philadelphia, but negotiated for value 
to CRC. The circuit court disagreed, 
and found in favor of the Estate for 
$57,447.67. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, questioning the 
authenticity of the 1979 note, reversed 
and remanded the case. On remand, 
the circuit court found that the 1979 
note could be used by CRC as a setoff 
against the Estate's claims, and held 
that a defensive use of setoff does not 
violate the legislative intent of section 
8-103. The court of special appeals 
affirmed the trial court's interpretation 
of section 8-103(a), which denied the 
creditors from presenting the note, 
but pelmitted CRC to offs~t the value 
of the note from the debts owed to 
the Estate. Following the ruling, the 
court of appeals granted certiorari. 
In determining whether the right 
to setoff a claim is a type of claim 
barred by section 8-103, the court 
of appeals began its analysis by 
comparing the impact setoffwould 
have as compared to a counterclaim 
and recoupment. Imbesi, 357 Md. 
at 380,744 A.2d at 552. Setoff, by 
definition, is "a diminution or a 
complete counterbalancing of the 
adversary's claim based upon 
circumstances arising out of a 
transaction other than that on which 
the adversary's claim is based." Id 
at 380, 744 A.2d at 552 (citing 
Billman v. State of Maryland 
Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 88 Md. 
App. 79, 92-93, 593 A.2d 684 
(1991 )). In the instant case, CRC 
argued that the only feasible remedy 
available to creditors is the right to 
setoff. Due to the presentment of the 
claim after the statutory period of 
section 8-1 03( c), the creditor argued 
that since the transaction failed to 
occur in the same transaction or 
occurrence as the prior business 
dealing, all claims of recoupment 
would be barred. Id. CRC 
contended, and the court of special 
appeals agreed, that use of the note 
to setoff the amount owed to the 
Estate is a purely defensive tactic, and 
should be permitted in order to offset 
the monies owed to the estate via the 
stock redemption agreement. ld. at 
382, 744 A.2d at 552. 
The court of appeals squarely 
rejected the court of special appeals's 
argument, as well as CRC's, that 
setoff does not affect the timely and 
efficient process that section 8-103 
was drafted to protect. ld. at 382, 
744 A.2d at 553. The general 
purpose of section 8-103, the court 
held, is to provide notice to all 
creditors of the Estate so they may 
file their claims in the applicable time 
period, thereby allowing probate to 
progress in an expedient manner. ld. 
Following this interpretation, the court 
found that a setoff defense would 
require consideration of the facts and 
circumstances of a separate 
transaction. ld. 
The court further noted that the 
legislative history of the statute 
illustrated a policy of increasing the 
scope of protection by the non-claim 
statute. ld. at 383, 744 A.2d at 553. 
The authority given to the non-claim 
statute was reinforced by the judicial 
history of the statute, which illustrated 
the increase, not dimunition, of power 
the judiciary has interpreted in the 
statute over the years. ld. at 382-86, 
744 A.2d at 553-55. Furthermore, 
the intent of the language and history 
of the statute was to "forever bar" 
claims that were not brought within the 
applicable time period set forth in the 
statute. ld. at 386,744 A.2d at 554. 
The court, however, was careful 
to state that the non-claim statute does 
not bar all claims in all circumstances. 
In Chandlee v. Stockley, the court, 
"held that the personal representative 
was estopped to assert the bar of the 
statute because of representations 
made on behalf of the estate that the 
injured plaintiff s claim would be 
paid." ld. at 385, 744 A.2d at 554 
(quoting Chandlee v. Stockley, 219 
Md. 493, 150 A.2d 438 (1959)). 
However, upon comparison to 
Jmbesi, CRC was never informed of 
the possibility of payment on their 
claim, but instead was consistently 
refused recognition of a valid claim 
due to CRC's failure to present the 
note to the Estate within the statutory 
period. ld. at 386, 744 A.2d at 555. 
Finally, the court of appeals 
analyzed the practices of other 
jurisdictions regarding the parameters 
of the non-claim statute. ld. at 389, 
744 A.2d at 557. In Berrigan v. 
Pearsall, the Connecticut court found 
that the non-claim statute was no more 
than a statute oflimitations which did 
not prohibit the defensive use of a 
claim of setoff. ld. at 389,744 A.2d 
at 557 (citing Berrigan v. Pearsall, 
46 Conn. 274 (1878)). The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland, however, 
opposed this view, stating, "we 
construe § 8-103(a) to bar a claim 
that has not been presented and that 
arises out of a transaction separate 
from the one which the estate claims." 
ld. at391, 744 A.2d at 558. 
Based on the foregoing legal 
analysis, the court concluded that the 
creditor in question could not assert 
a claim that was barred by limitations 
against a note owed to the Estate, due 
to section 8-103(c). Jd. at 392, 744 
A.2d at 558. The court found the 
non-claim statute not to be a statute 
oflimitations, but instead "a condition 
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precedent to a legal recovery against 
a solvent estate." ld. at 391, 744 
A.2d at 557. 
The court's holding leaves open 
the question of asserting a right of 
recoupment in instances where the 
same transaction is in question. In this 
instance, however, the court decided 
to create a clear limitations period. 
This bright line rule not only broadens 
the scope of the non-claim statute, but 
also ensures that probate will move 
along as expediently as possible, 
thereby underscoring the overall 
purpose of section 8-103. 
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